Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets by Tejada, Oriol & Rafels, Carles
DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL  
DE LA FACULTAT D’ECONOMIA I EMPRESA 
 
 
Col.lecció d’Economia 
E09/216 
 
 
 
Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in  
multi-sided assignment markets 
 
 
Oriol Tejada 
Carles Rafels 
 
 
 
 
Adreça correspondència: 
Departament of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics 
Facultat d’Economia i Empresa  
Universitat de Barcelona 
Av. Diagonal 690 
08034 Barcelona 
Email: oriol.tejada@ub.edu; crafels@ub.edu 
 
Acknowledgements: Support from grant Programa FPU of Ministerio de Educación y 
Ciencia of the Spanish Government and from the Barcelona Economics Program of 
CREA, Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia and FEDER, under grant ECO2008-
02344/ECON is acknowledged. 
Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets
Abstract: We extend Rochford’s (1983) notion of symmetrically pairwise-bargained equilibrium
to assignment games with more than two sides. A symmetrically multilateral-bargained
(SMB) allocation is a core allocation such that any agent is in equilibrium with respect to
a negotiation process among all agents based on what every agent could receive -and use as
a threat- in her preferred alternative matching to the optimal matching that is formed. We
prove that, for balanced multi-sided assignment games, the set of SMB is always nonempty
and that, unlike the two-sided case, it does not coincide in general with the kernel (Davis and
Maschler, 1965). We also give an answer to an open question formulated by Rochford (1983)
by introducing a kernel-based set that, together with the core, characterizes the set of SMB.
Keywords: Cooperative games, core, kernel, bargaining
JEL Classification: C71, C78
Resum: Aquest treball tracta d’extendre la nocio´ d’equilibri sime`tric de negociacio´ bilateral
introdu¨ıt per Rochford (1983) a jocs d’assignacio´ multilateral. Un pagament corresponent a
un equilibri sime`tric de negociacio´ multilateral (SMB) e´s una imputacio´ del core que garanteix
que qualsevol agent es troba en equilibri respecte a un proce´s de negociacio´ entre tots els
agents basat en allo` que cadascun d’ells podria rebre -i fer servir com a amenac¸a- en un
’matching’ o`ptim diferent al que s’ha format. Es prova que, en el cas de jocs d’assignacio´
multilaterals, el conjunt de SMB e´s sempre no buit i que, a difere`ncia del cas bilateral,
no sempre coincideix amb el kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Finalment, responem una
pregunta oberta per Rochford (1982) tot introdu¨ınt un conjunt basat en la idea de kernel,
que, conjuntament amb el core, ens permet caracteritzar el conjunt de SMB.
1 Introduction
In a m-sided assignment game (Quint, 1991) there are m different types of agents and a
single worth is attached to any coalition of exactly one agent of each type -what will be called
an essential coalition-. The worth of any arbitrary coalition is obtained by partitioning it
into essential coalitions and singletons (that have zero worth), adding up their worth and,
finally, keeping the maximum of such values. Multilateral assignment markets represent
many situations in which multiple partnerships are formed and can be modeled by m-sided
assignment games (see Tejada and Rafels, 2009, for some examples and a further justification
on that link).
In their seminal paper about two-sided assignment games, Shapley and Shubik (1972)
prove that two-sided sided assignment games have always a nonempty core, whereas Kaneko
and Wooders (1982) -in a more general framework- and Quint (1991) show that this property
does not hold for arbitrary m-sided assignment games.
Tejada and Rafels (2009) show that, for multi-sided assignment games, there is a bijection
between competitive prices and core allocations. Therefore, the core represents the very first
main approximation to resolve the problem of predicting which prices will emerge in a multi-
sided assignment market. Nevertheless, Shapley and Shubik (1972) already noticed that one
of the main drawbacks of the core as a prediction of the outcome of a cooperative game, in
particular of a multi-sided assignment game, is that it is based only on what agents can do,
not on what they can prevent other agents to do.
In this paper we show that, if agents do not base their behavioral strategy only on
what they can do but also on what they can prevent others to do, the core of a balanced
multi-sided assignment game can be non-trivially refined. This is made introducing a set
of multilateral-bargained (SMB) allocations, that generalizes the set of pairwise-bargained
(SPB) allocations introduced by Rochford (1983). In particular, for two-sided assignment
games this refinement coincides with the intersection between the kernel and the core, as
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Rochford (1983) demonstrates, which is, in fact, the kernel itself (Driessen, 1998 and Granot,
1995)1. We show that this coincidence fails to hold for arbitrary multi-sided assignment
games. Nevertheless, we show that if the kernel is slightly modified, the set of SMB can be
characterized by this new kernel-based set. For two-sided assignment games, this last set is
precisely the kernel.
In fact, Rochford already noticed that, for more than two sides, the kernel might not be
the most appropriate solution set. In her words (Rochford, 1983, p. 278), ”In a game where
the resulting coalition structure contains coalitions with more than two members, it is not
clear why a solution based on pairwise equilibrium is appropriate”.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the notation and
background results needed. In Section 3 we define symmetrically multilateral-bargained SMB
allocations. Finally, in Section 4 we present the main results of the paper.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
Consider a market in which there are m different finite sets (or types) of agents N1, ..., Nm
such that n1 = |N
1|, ..., nm = |N
m|. With some abuse of notation2, for all j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m we
denote N j = {1, 2, ..., nj}. By convention (see Quint, 1991), we refer to the i-th agent of type
j as j-i. We call any m-tuple of agents E = (i1, ..., im) ∈ N
1× ...×Nm an essential coalition.
As an abuse of notation, and when no confusion is possible, we will also use E to refer to the
set {1-i1, ...,m-im}.
A m-sided assignment problem (m-SAP), that will be denoted by (N1, ..., Nm;A), is
characterized by a nonnegativem-dimensional matrixA = (ai1...im)i1∈N1,...,im∈Nm . An arbitrary
entry of A , namely ai1...im, corresponds to the worth that is attached to any essential coalition
1In light of Driessen (1998) and Granot and Granot (1995), what Rochford (1983) actually did, therefore,
was giving a different characterization of the kernel of a two-sided assignment game in terms of a bargaining
process based on threats.
2Formally, for any j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, Nj should be denoted by {j}×{1, .., nj}. Then, any agent is a pair (j, ij),
j denoting the type of the agent and ij denoting the index within the set of agents of her same type.
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E = (i1, ..., im). Observe that A can be cast to a mapping from N
1× ...×Nm to R+ defined
by A(i1, ..., im) = ai1...im.
If n1 = n2 = ... = nm = n we say that (N
1, ..., Nm;A) is square. A dummy agent is
such that the worth of any essential coalition ’containing’ her is always zero. Dummy agents
do not alter the characteristic function when we restrict to real players (see, for instance,
Quint (1991) for a complete argument). Therefore, by adding dummy agents, from now on
we will assume, without loss of generality, that (N1, ..., Nm;A) is square. In fact, in addition
to (N1, ..., Nm;A) being square, another dummy agent will always be artificially introduced
for each type. The reason to do that will be apparent below in Section 3.
A matching µ = {E1, ..., Et} among N1, ..., Nm is a set of essential coalitions such that
|µ| = t = min1≤j≤m |N
j | and any agent j-i belongs at most to one essential coalition
E1, ..., Et. We say that agent j-i is unassigned by µ if she does not belong to Ek for
any 1 ≤ k ≤ t. We denote by M(N1, ..., Nm) the set of all matchings among N1, ..., Nm. A
matching is optimal if it maximizes
∑
(i1,...,im)∈µ
A(i1, ..., im) in M(N
1, ..., Nm). We denote
by M∗A(N
1, ..., Nm) the set of all optimal matchings of (N1, ..., Nm;A).
Following Shapley and Shubik (1972) and Quint (1991), for each multi-sided assignment
problem (N1, ..., Nm;A) the m-sided assignment game (m-SAG) is the cooperative game3
(N,ωA) with set of players N = {j-i : 1 ≤ j ≤ m, 1 ≤ i ≤ nj} and characteristic function ωA
defined by
ωA(S) = max
µ∈M(N1∩S,...,Nm∩S)
 ∑
(i1,...,im)∈µ
A(i1, ..., im)
 ,
where the summation over the empty set is zero. Notice that if m = 2 the setting reduces to
the classic Shapley-Shubik assignment market.
The core of a game is the set of imputations that cannot be improved upon by any
coalition on its own. Quint (1991) shows that, given a square multi-sided assignment game,
3A cooperative game is a pair (N, v), where N is the set of players and v, the characteristic function,
associates a numerical value v(S) ∈ R to any coalition S ⊆ N , being v(∅) = 0.
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its core, C(ωA), is the set of nonnegative vectors x satisfying
(1) A(i1, ..., im)−
m∑
j=1
xjij ≤ 0,
for any (i1, ..., im) ∈ N
1 × ... × Nm, where (1) must be tight if (i1, ..., im) belongs to some
optimal matching.
On the other hand, for any imputation4 x of (N,ωA) and any coalition S ⊆ N , the excess
of coalition S with respect to x is defined by e(S, x) = ωA(S)− x(S), where x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi.
Given (N,ωA) an arbitrary m-SAG, we introduce the following set, that is defined for any
pair of agents j-i and any k-l,
(2) Γj-i,k-l = {S ⊆ N : j-i ∈ S, k-l /∈ S} ,
Them, for any x ∈ I(ωA), the surplus of agent j-i against agent k-l at x is
(3) sj-i,k-l(x) = max {e(S, x) : S ∈ Γj-i,k-l} .
The above expression can be interpreted as the maximum that agent j-i can expect to obtain
(if negative, the least she can expect to lose) if she departs from x without agent k-l’s
collaboration and assuming that other agents are happy with what they recieve in x. Notice
that sj-i,k-l(x) is a bilateral concept, in the sense that only two agents, j-i and k-l, are involved
in the definition. Then, an idea of bilateral equilibrium is formulated in the following property:
(P) sj-i,k-l(x) = sk-l,j-i(x) for all 1 ≤ j, k ≤ m, 1 ≤ i, l ≤ n such that j-i 6= k-l.
Observe that (P) implies that each pair of agents are in equilibrium through the bargaining
4Given a cooperative game (N, v), the set of imputations is defined by I(v) = {x ∈ Rn : xi ≥
v({i}),
∑n
i=1 xi = v(N)}.
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process defined in (3). The kernel of (N,ωA) is the set
5
K(ωA) = {x ∈ I(ωA) : x satisfies (P)} .
3 Main definitions
Let (N,ωA) be a balanced m-SAG and let (µ, x) be the ’current’ stable outcome. That is,
agents are matched under an optimal matching µ and are paid the payoff x ∈ C(ωA). Then
suppose that some agent wonders about what would happen if she broke the essential coalition
she belongs to in µ, formed a new essential coalition, payed to her hypothetical new partners
the worth they are receiving in the current payoff x, whereas she would appropriate the rest
of the worth of the new formed coalition. Since x is a core allocation, such worth will never
be larger than what she is currently receiving in x. In fact, the more such worth is below
than what she is receiving in x, the less credible a threaten she might pose on other agents
not to deviate from (µ, x) is. This is true in the sense that any change in the outcome would
drive her lose part of her current payoff, whereas other agents would benefit. As any agent
in the market can think in the same way, one would expect that, given a proposed allocation
x, after a negotiation process among all agents, they should be paid exactly what they can
threaten. However, such payoffs might not be efficient, in the sense that the market is always
able to provide at least the whole resources to pay all agents their threats, but many times
can pay more. In such case, the most straightforward idea to share the remaining benefits is
to distribute them symmetrically.
To formalize all the above ideas we introduce the following set, that is defined for any
5The kernel is introduced by Davis and Maschler (1965). However, to be accurate, the definition provided
in our paper is that of the pre-kernel (Maschler, Peleg and Shapley, 1972, 1979). Nevertheless, Maschler and
Peleg (1967) prove that for zero-normalized and monotonic games the kernel coincides with the pre-kernel,
which is always nonempty. A game (N, v) is zero-normalized if v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N and is monotonic if
v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever S ⊆ T ⊆ N . Finally, it is straightforward to check that multi-sided assignment games
are zero-normalized and monotonic.
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agent j-i and any essential coalition E,
(4) Γξj-i,E =
{
E˜ ∈ N1 × ...×Nm : j-i ∈ E˜, E 6= E˜
}
,
The concept of threat, that generalizes Rochford’s (1983) definition to m-SAGs with more
than two sides, is introduced in the following definition.
Definition 1 Given a balanced m-SAG (N,ωA), µ ∈ M
∗
A(N
1, ..., Nm) and x ∈ C(ωA), the
vector of threats t(x) ∈ Rnm is defined by
tji(x) = max
(k1,...,kj−1,i,kj+1,...,km)∈Γ
ξ
j-i,E
A(k1, ..., kj−1, i, kj+1, ..., km)−
m∑
s=1,s 6=j
xsks
 ,
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where j-i ∈ E and E ∈ µ.
Some remarks must be made on the above definition. First observe that xji − tji(x) is
the minimum loss that agent j-i would incur if, for some reason, the essential coalition she
belongs to in some stable outcome broke. On the other hand, since x ∈ C(ωA) and we have
assumed that for any type there is at least one dummy agent6, we have that 0 ≤ tji(x) ≤ xji.
Lastly, and most important, it can be checked that the vector of threats does not depend on
the optimal matching µ chosen7.
The idea of a symmetrically sharing of the remainders of a negotiation process based on
the above threats is formally introduced in the following definition and generalizes that from
Rochford (1983) to m-SAGs with more than two sides.
Definition 2 Given a balanced m-SAG (N,ωA), µ ∈ M
∗
A(N
1, ..., Nm) and x ∈ C(ωA), the
vector of symmetrically bargained incomes b(x) ∈ Rnm+ is defined by
bji(x) = tji(x) +
1
m
A(i1, ..., im)− tji(x)− m∑
s=1,s 6=j
tsis(x)

6I.e. there really are n+ 1 agents of each type, since for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m, jn+1 is a dummy agent. However,
we will only care about those with index lower than n + 1. This can be made without loss of generality and
it is an assumption that Rochford (1983) also makes.
7Let µ1 6= µ2 be two optimal matchings. The non-trivial case occurs when agent j-i is matched in µ1 and
µ2 to different partners, i.e., when j-i ∈ E ∈ µ1, j-i ∈ E′ ∈ µ2 and E 6= E′. In such case E′ ∈ Γµ
1
j-i,E and E ∈
Γµ
2
j-i,E′
. Lastly, since x ∈ C(ωA), t
µ1
ji (x) = t
µ2
ji (x) = xji.
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for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where (i1, ..., ij−1, i, ij+1, ..., im) ∈ µ.
Again, it is important to point out that b(x) does not depend on the specific optimal
matching chosen. Indeed, it is not difficult to show that the set of all agents can be
partitioned in two sets, both of them having the same number of agents of all types: those
that belong to the same essential coalition in any optimal matching and those that do
not. If agent j-i belongs to the first subset, we trivially have that b
µ1
ji (x) = b
µ2
ji (x) for any
µ1, µ2 ∈ M
∗
A(N
1, ..., Nm). On the other hand, threats of agents of the second set coincide with
their payoff in x, which, after some calculations, implies that bµji(x) = tji(x) for any agent
j-i of the second set. In conclusion, b(x) does not depend on the specific optimal assignment
chosen. Additionally observe that, given x ∈ C(ωA), the vector of symmetrically bargained
incomes b(x) pays to each agent j-i his threat plus a ’symmetric’ part of the (negative or
positive) difference between the worth of any essential coalition that contains her and belongs
to some optimal matching µ and the threats of agent j-i herself and her partners in µ. In
particular, given x ∈ C(ωA) a new vector b(x) is obtained after a process of bargaining.
As usual, we focus our attention on those allocations that are invariant through the above
bargaining procedure.
Definition 3 Given a balanced m-SAG (N,ωA), the set of symmetrically multilateral-bargained
(SMB) allocations is
SMB(ωA) = {x ∈ C(ωA) : x = b(x)} .
Notice that SMB(ωA) is only defined for balanced m-SAGs and is a subset (or a refinement)
of the core. In the next section we will prove that SMB(ωA) is always nonempty for balanced
m-SAGs (see Theorem 7) and that, unlike the two-sided case, it does not coincide with the
kernel (see Example 8). Furthermore, we will prove that, for more than two sides, the kernel
can be slightly modified so that a characterization of SMB(ωA) in terms of this new kernel-
based set is still possible (see Theorem 6), hence extending Rochford’s (1983) result and
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proving that her intuition about the non-appropriateness of the kernel in m-SAGs, in which
the ’essential’ coalitions consist on more than two agents, was right.
In addition to all the above, recall that an allocation belongs to the kernel of a m-sided
assignment, K(ωA), if any pair of agents in the market, namely j-i and k-l, are in equilibrium
through a bilateral bargaining, that is sj-i,k-l(x) = sk-l,j-i(x). However, as we have already
said, in a m-SAG, it is m agents (one of each side) that are needed to make a deal. Hence,
it seems natural to look for multilateral equilibria instead of bilateral equilibria. To do so
we extend the surplus functions given in (3) to include surpluses of any agent either against
essential coalitions containing her or singletons. Formally, given (N,ωA) an arbitrary m-SAG,
we introduce the following set, that is defined for any agent j-i and any B being either an
essential coalition containing j-i or a singleton,
(5) Γj-i,B = {S ⊆ N : j-i ∈ S, B * S} .
Observe that, whenB is an essential coalition, let us say E, then Γj-i,E∩
{
E˜ : E˜ ∈ N1 × ...×Nm
}
is precisely the set introduced in (4). On the other hand, when B is a singleton, the set defined
in (5) is exactly the set defined in (2). For any x ∈ I(ωA), the surplus of agent j-i against B
at x is
(6) sj-i,B(x) = max {e(S, x) : S ∈ Γj-i,B} ,
where, again, B is either an essential coalition containing j-i or a singleton. Notice that,
for m = 2, (6) coincides with (3). This having been defined, we introduce a kernel-based
set that requires that, after a bargaining process among all agents, none of them should be
’discriminated’ against agents of her same type (P1) whereas agents of any possible essential
coalition should make a ’fair’ deal among them (P2).
Definition 4 Given an arbitrary m-SAG (N,ωA), the multi-sided kernel (in short, m-Kernel)
is the set
Km(ωA) = {x ∈ I(ωA) : x satisfies (P1) and (P2)} ,
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where
(P1) sj-i,j-l(x) = sj-l,j-i(x) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m, 1 ≤ i 6= l ≤ n.
(P2) s1-i1,E(x) = ... = sm-im,E(x) for all E = (i1, ..., im) ∈ N
1 × ...×Nm.
Notice that, in the above definition, we do not require (N,ωA) to be balanced. Moreover,
in the next section we will prove that Km(ωA) is always nonempty, regardless (N,ωA) is
balanced or not (see Theorem 5). Lastly, the reader can check that, given a balanced m-SAG
(N,ωA), if x ∈ C(ωA) then sj-i,k-l(x) = 0 for any agents j-i and k-l that are not assigned
together under some optimal matching. This implies the following remark.
Remark 1 Given a balanced m-SAG (N,ωA) and x ∈ C(ωA), then x ∈ Km(ωA) if and only
if x satisfies (P2).
4 Main results
This section is primarily devoted to prove that, for any balanced m-SAG (N,ωA), the set
SMB(ωA) is nonempty and can be characterized by the multi-sided kernel. First we show
that the kernel is always included in the multi-sided kernel.
Theorem 5 For any arbitrary m-SAG (N,ωA), the kernel of (N,ωA) is always included in
the multi-sided kernel of (N,ωA), i.e. K(ωA) ⊆ Km(ωA).
Proof. Take x ∈ K(ωA) and assume, without loss of generality, that E = (1, ..., 1) and
that s1-1,E(x) ≥ ... ≥ sm-1,E(x). On one hand, suppose that there is S
∗ ∈ Γ1-1.E such that
m-1 ∈ S∗ and s1-1,E(x) = e(S
∗, x). By definition of Γ1-1.E, there is j, 2 ≤ j ≤ m−1 such that
j-1 /∈ S∗. Hence, s1-1,E(x) ≥ sm-1,E(x) ≥ sm-1,j-1(x) ≥ e(S
∗, x) = s1-1,E(x), which implies
that all inequalities must be tight. On the other hand, suppose that, for all S ∈ Γ1-1,E such
that m-1 ∈ S, we have that s1-1,E(x) > e(S, x). Then, s1-1,m-1(x) = s1-1,E(x) and, since
x ∈ K(ωA), we obtain that s1-1,E(x) ≥ sm-1,E(x) ≥ sm-1,1-1(x) = s1-1,m-1(x) = s1-1,E(x).
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Again, all inequalities must be tight. In conclusion, s1-1,E(x) = ... = sm-1,E(x) and, since
E = (1, ..., 1) was picked without loss of generality, K(ωA) ⊆ Km(ωA).
Example 8 at the end of the paper shows that the inclusion of K(ωA) into Km(ωA) is
sometimes strict.
The main theorem of the paper is devoted to characterizing the set of symmetrically
multilateral-bargained allocations of a balanced multi-sided assignment game in terms of the
core and the multi-sided kernel, hence generalizing Rochford’s (1983) main result.
Theorem 6 Given a balanced m-SAG (N,ωA), SMB(ωA) = C(ωA) ∩Km(ωA).
Proof. Before proving the two inclusions we show that given µ ∈ M∗A(N
1, ..., Nm), E ∈ µ
and j-i ∈ E then, for any x ∈ C(ωA), we have that
(7) sj-i,E(x) = −xji + tji(x).
Throughout the whole proof we will assume, without loss of generality, that µ = {(i, ..., i) :
1 ≤ i ≤ n} is an optimal matching of (N1, ..., Nm;A). In particular, given j-i an arbitrary
agent, E = (i, ..., i) is the essential coalition of µ that contains j-i. By Definition 1 and (6),
we have that, for any agent j-i,
sj-i,E(x) = max {e(S, x) : S ∈ Γj-i,E}
≥ max
{
e(S, x) : S ∈ Γξj-i,E
}
= −xji + tji(x).(8)
We will prove (7) by the counterreciprocal. Indeed, suppose that the above inequality is
strict, i.e., that there is S ∈ Γj-i,E such that .
(9) e(S, x) > −xji + tji(x)
Since S ∈ Γj-i,E and E = (i, ..., i), there must be k ∈ {1, ..., n} such that k-i /∈ S. Let
µ˜ ∈ M∗A(N
1 ∩ S, ...,Nm ∩ S). We distinguish two cases.
• Case 1:
∣∣S ∩N j∣∣ ≤ mink∈{1,..,j−1,j+1,...,m} ∣∣S ∩Nk∣∣.
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In this case, j-i must be assigned under µ˜. We denote the essential coalition that
contains j-i by
(
µ˜−11 (i), ..., µ˜
−1
m (i)
)
, where µ˜−1j (i) = i and, for k ∈ {1, ..., j − 1, j +
1, ...,m}, µ˜−1k (i) is the index of the agent of type k that is assigned together with j-i
under µ˜. Observe that, since k-i /∈ S, we have that µ˜−1k (i) 6= i. Then,
e (S, x) =
∑
(i1,...,im)∈µ˜
A(i1, ..., im)−
∑
h-r∈S
xhr
= A(µ˜−11 (i), ..., µ˜
−1
m (i)) − xji −
m∑
h=1,h 6=i
xhµ˜−1
h
(i)
+
∑
(i1,...,im)∈µ˜
ij 6=i
(
A(i1, ..., im)−
m∑
h=1
xhih
)
−x
(
S\
(
∪(i1,...,im)∈µ˜{1-i1, ...,m-im}
))
≤ −xji +A(µ˜
−1
1 (i), ..., µ˜
−1
m (i)) −
m∑
h=1
h 6=i
xhµ˜−1
h
(i)
≤ −xji + tji(x),
where the first inequality holds since x ∈ C(ωA) and the second inequality holds by
Definition 1, since
(
µ˜−11 (i), ..., µ˜
−1
m (i)
)
∈ Γξj-i,E because µ˜
−1
k (i) 6= i.
• Case 2:
∣∣S ∩N j∣∣ > mink∈{1,..,j−1,j+1,...,m} ∣∣S ∩Nk∣∣ .
If j-i is assigned under µ˜, it is left to reader to prove that an analogous argument as the
above demonstrates that e (S, x) ≤ −xji+ tji(x). Thus, suppose that j-i is not assigned
under µ˜ or that there is no such µ˜. In such case we have
e (S, x) =
∑
(i1,...,im)∈µ˜
A(i1, ..., im)−
∑
hr∈S
xhr
=
∑
(i1,...,im)∈µ˜
(
A(i1, ..., im)−
m∑
h=1
xhih
)
−x
(
S\
(
{j-i} ∪(i1,...,im)∈µ˜ {1-i1, ...,m-im}
))
− xji
≤ −xji ≤ −xji + tji(x),
where the first inequality holds again because x ∈ C(ωA) and the last inequality holds
since tji(x) ≥ 0.
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In conclusion, we have proved that e(S, x) ≤ −xji+tji(x), which contradicts the assumption
made in (9). Hence, inequality in (8) must be tight, which implies that (7) must hold.
Having (7) been proved, we are in a position to prove the theorem. First we prove that
SMB(ωA) ⊇ C(ωA) ∩ Km(ωA). Indeed, take x ∈ C(ωA) ∩ Km(ωA). On one hand, since
x ∈ C(ωA), we have
(10)
m∑
k=1
xki = A(i, ..., i).
On the other hand, since x ∈ Km(ωA), we also have that sj-i,E(x) = sk-i,E(x) for all 1 ≤ k 6=
j ≤ m, where E = (i, ..., i). Thus, applying (7) we obtain that
(11) xki = xji − tji(x) + tki(x)
for all 1 ≤ k 6= j ≤ m, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Lastly, combining (10) and (11) we get
xji = A(i, ..., i) −
m∑
k=1,k 6=j
xki
= A(i, ..., i) −
m∑
k=1,k 6=j
(xji − tji(x) + tki(x))
= A(i, ..., i) − (m− 1)xji +mtji(x)−
m∑
k=1
tki(x),
for 1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ i ≤ n, which is equivalent to
xji = tji(x) +
1
m
(
A(i, ..., i) −
m∑
k=1
tki(x)
)
= bji(x).
In conclusion, x ∈ SMB(ωA).
Second, we prove that SMB(ωA) ⊆ C(ωA) ∩ Km(ωA). Since, by definition, SMB(ωA)
is always included in C(ωA), we only have to check that SMB(ωA) ⊆ Km(ωA). Indeed, let
x ∈ SMB(ωA). Then, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have that
xji = bji(x) = tji(x) +
1
m
(
A(i, ..., i) −
m∑
s=1
tsi(x)
)
.
Applying (7) to sj-i,E(x), where E = (i, ..., i), and using the above equality we obtain
sj-i,E(x) = −xji + tji(x) =
1
m
(
m∑
s=1
tsi(x)−A(i, ..., i)
)
,
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that does not depend on j. Hence, s1-i,E(x) = ... = sm-i,E(x) for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since we
have chosen E = (i, ..., i) ∈ µ without loss of generality, we have proved that (P2) holds for
any essential coalition belonging to some optimal matching. It remains to show that this
implies that (P2) also holds for any coalition that does not belong to any optimal matching,
in particular µ. Let E˜ = (i1, ..., im) be one of such coalitions and take j ∈ {2, ...,m}. On one
hand, if ij = i1, since x ∈ C(ωA), by (3) we have that s1-i1,j-i1(x) ≤ 0. On the other hand, if
ij 6= i1, we have that s1-i1,j-ij(x) = 0 because 1-i1 and j-ij are not assigned together under
µ. Hence, since E˜ /∈ µ implies that there is at least one j ∈ {2, ...,m} such that ij 6= i1, we
obtain that
s1-i1,E˜(x) = max2≤j≤m
{
s1-i1,j-ij (x)
}
= 0.
Lastly, since above we have chosen s1-i1,E˜(x) without loss of generality, then s1-i1,E˜(x) = ... =
s
m-im,E˜
(x) = 0, that is, (P2) holds for any arbitrary essential coalition E˜. In conclusion,
together with Remark 1, we have proved that x ∈ Km(ωA).
A detailed revision of the above proof reveals that, in fact, given a balanced m-SAG
(N,ωA), a core allocation x belongs to Km(ωA) if and only if (P2) holds for all the essential
coalitions of an arbitrary optimal matching.
Moreover, as a consequence of the above theorem we prove that the set of symmetrically
multilateral-bargained allocations is always non-emtpy for any balanced m-SAG.
Theorem 7 Let (N,ωA) be any balanced m-SAG. Then, the set of symmetrically multilateral-
bargained allocations, SMB(ωA), is nonempty.
Proof. It holds directly from Theorem 5, Theorem 6 and the fact that C(ωA) ∩K(ωA) is
nonempty (Schmeidler, 1969, proves it for arbitrary balanced games).
To illustrate the results contained in the paper, let us consider the following example.
Example 8 Let (N1, N2, N3;A) be an 3-SAP with two agents of each type given by the
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following matrix, where the optimal matching is marked in bold:
A =
 3
0
0
0

 2
0
0
0
 .
It can be checked that K(ωA) = K(ωA) ∩ C(ωA) = {(
5
4 , 0;
5
4 , 0;
1
2 , 0)}, that Km(ωA) =
Km(ωA) ∩ C(ωA) = {(x11, 0;x21; 0;
1
2 , 0) : x11 + x21 =
5
2 , x11 ≥
1
2 , x21 ≥
1
2} and that
C(ωA) = {(x11, 0;x21; 0; 3 − x11 − x21, 0) : 2 ≤ x11 + x21 ≤ 3, x11 ≥ 0, x21 ≥ 0}. The
projections of the three latter onto the space {(x11, x21)} ⊂ R2 are drawn in Figure 1.
..
.
.
.
.
.
(0, 0)
(0, 2)
(0, 3)
(12 , 2)
( 5
4 , 5
4 )
(2, 0)
(2, 12)
(3, 0)
x11
x21
Figure 1: The core, the kernel and the m-kernel of the 3-SAG of the example.
That is, within {(x11, x21)} ⊂ R2+, C(ωA) corresponds to the polygon delimited by (0, 2),
(2, 0), (3, 0) and (0, 3), Km(ωA) corresponds to the segment between (
1
2 , 2) and (2,
1
2) and
K(ωA) corresponds to just (
5
4 ,
5
4 ). Observe that, in this example, K(ωA)  Km(ωA) =
SMB(ωA)  C(ωA). It is still an open question to know whether, for any balanced multi-
sided assignment game, the multi-sided kernel is always included in the core.
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